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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: MENTAL PATIENTS AND
COURT ORDERED STANDARDS OF TREATMENT
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972)
In a class action on behalf of patients involuntarily committed to Alabama
mental institutions, petitioner alleged inadequate treatment and prayed for
judicial supervision of institutional treatment programs. The Federal District
Court for the Middle District of Alabama, which had earlier recognized a
constitutional right to treatment for those confined in state mental institutions,' found the Alabama institutions to be in violation of this right and
HELD, that treatment programs were constitutionally and medically inadequate and ordered defendant to implement standards included in the
2
judicial decree within six months.
Involuntary commitment of the mentally ill as a procedural development
paralleled the evolution of public mental institutions in the United States. 3
Prior to that time, care for those with mental disturbances had been provided
by families and community compensated guardians? The advent of public
institutions offered relief from this burden on private citizens. Thereafter, a
person could be confined upon the request of a friend or relative. However,
in the middle of the nineteenth century there developed a judicial recognition of the problems inherent in involuntary confinement procedures. In 1845
one Joshua Oakes brought a habeas corpus petition to challenge his confinement in a Massachusetts mental institution. The court there stated: 6
The right to restrain an insane person of his liberty is found in
that great law of humanity, which makes it necessary to confine those
whose going at large would be dangerous to themselves or others....
And the necessity which creates the law, creates the limitation of the
law.
There are two traditional justifications for involuntary commitment. One
justification stems from the inherent police power to protect the health,
safety, and general welfare of residents.7 The second is based on the state's
role as parens patriae.8 Perhaps the earlier years of commitment proceedings
relied more on the first justification, concern being focused on protection of
the community rather than on the individual. 9 However, realization that the
1. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
2. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
3. THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 10, 15 (F. LINDMAN & D. McINTYRE, JR. ed.
1961) [hereinafter cited as LINDMAN].

4. Id.
5.

Id. at 16.

6. Matter of Josia Oakes, 8

LAW REPORTER

note 3, at 12 n.33.
7. Note, Involuntary Civil Commitment: A
SYPACUSE L. REv. 125 (1972).
8. Id.
9. LINDMAN, supra note 3, at 17.

125 (1845-1846), cited in

LINDMAN,

supra

Constitutional Right to Treatment, 23
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individual himself had certain rights1 ° brought forth the parens patriae
notion:'1 protecting one unable to care for himself. This recognition of the
individual's interest in his confinement led to legal restrictions on the commitment process. 1 2 Some states began to incorporate due process requirements
into the procedures for involuntary commitment. 3 Failure to provide a
hearing on the reasons for commitment was found unconstitutional,- 4 and
most jurisdictions initiated the requirement of notice prior to hearing.0
Presently, however, only seventeen states provide a statutory right to counsel
at the hearing;' 6 the remaining jurisdictions allow a private attorney to
participate, but do not provide appointed counsel. In many areas the right
to counsel is actively opposed by members of the medical profession who
contend that they should be the chief decisionmakers in the commitment
process. 18
In 1968 a federal court recognized in Heryford v. Parker9 that every
person subject to commitment proceedings should be entitled to the guidance
of counsel at every step of the proceedings. Many state legislatures have failed
to respond to this precedent. Presently, a right to notice and hearing is
widely recognized, but the right to counsel is established in only a minority
of jurisdictions. Finally, twelve states provide none of the procedural guarantees cited above because the statutory commitment procedure in those states
20
is administrative rather than judicial.
Traditionally, involuntary commitment has been deemed a civil rather
than a criminal type of procedure.2 ' Since confinement in a mental hospital
10. Id. at 16.

11. Recognition of individual rights is characteristic of the concept of parens patriae
defined as "the sovereign power of guardianship over persons under disability." BLAcK's
LAW DIcTONARY 1269 (4th ed. 1957).
12. LmnmAN, supra note 3, at 16.
13.

Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 31 N.C.L. REv. 274, 276 (1953).

14. State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1954).
15. Appeal of Sleeper, 147 Me. 302, 87 A.2d 115 (1952); State ex rel. Anderson v.
United States Veterans Hospital, 268 Minn. 213, 128 N.W.2d 710 (1964); In re Moynihan,
332 Mo. 1022, 62 S.W.2d 410 (1933).
16. LmDMAN, supra note 3, at 29.
17. Id.

18. A survey of New York judges and physicians revealed that only 29% of doctors
surveyed felt that a right to counsel was important to the subject of involuntary commitment proceedings.

SPECIAL CoMMrrraE oF THE BAR oF THE CrrY OF NEW YORK wrrH THE

CORNELL LAW ScHOoL, MENTAL ILLNESs AND DUE PROcESS

272 (1972). This problem has been

widely recognized by students of the commitment process. See, e.g., Note, The Right to
Treatment: An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. Cu. L. REv. 755, 765 (1969): "Whenever
deprivation of liberty is in issue, it is often not fully realized that law, and not psychiatry,
is the ultimate decision-maker."
19. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
20. LINDMAN, supra note 3, at 30.
21. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), in which the Supreme Court applied standards
of due process to commitment proceedings against an alleged juvenile delinquent. In so

doing, the Court reiterated an earlier statement: "We do not mean . . . to indicate that
the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial."
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss3/11

2

616

Milton:
Constitutional
MentalLAW
Patients
and Court Ordered
o
[Vol. Standards
XXV
UNIVERSITY
OFLaw:
FLORIDA
REVIEW

is seen as a medical solution to the problem of mental illness, the procedural
guarantees inherent in criminal confinements have often been withheld.
However, the nature of the two types of confinement is substantially the same;
many mental institutions provide little more than custodial care for their
inmatesY2 Medical treatment, the raison d'etre of confinement, is largely
lacking, often because of inadequate personnel and facilities. A study of the
incidence of arrests in a Maryland psychiatric population for the five years
preceding commitment and for the five years following release revealed no
difference in arrest rates after the commitment period.2 3 The therapeutic
effect of hospitalization was either virtually nonexistent or largely ineffectual.
Such conclusions spawned an awareness of the problems of institutionalization in the late 1950's. As of 1960, however, no cases recognized a right to
treatment for those involuntarily committed.2 4 Nevertheless, in dicta the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized in 1960 that without treatment for patients, a mental hospital is transformed "into a penitentiary where one would be held indefinitely for no convicted offense. " ' 25
In 1964 the District of Columbia created a statutory right to treatment
for those confined in mental institutions within the District.2 6 Following that
enactment, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia underscored
the right in Rouse v. Cameron,27 including absence of treatment among the
grounds for a habeas corpus petition. The Rouse decision was followed in
rapid succession by three more cases in which the court of appeals remanded
the treatment question for factual determination.28 In one of these cases the
court pointed out that in the four months preceding the hearing the petitioner
had seen an institutional psychiatrist only three times and had not participated in therapy during that time.2 9 Stressing the inadequacy of such institutional conduct, the court in dicta recognized the possibility of immediate
release for a patient not accorded treatment opportunities."0
Several states have followed Congress in establishing a statutory right to
treatment for those involuntarily committed. 31 In the principal case, however,
the district court had no such statutory support. The case represented the
22. In 1958 there were 545,000 persons housed in nonfederal public mental institutions,
which had a 520,000 bed capacity; 85,000 of these beds were considered unacceptable because of fire and safety hazards. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 500 (1960).
23. READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 222 (R. Allen, E. Ferster & J. Rubin ed. 1968).
24. Birnbaum, supra note 22, at 503.
25. Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
26. D.C. CODE §21-562 (Supp. V, 1966).
27. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
28. Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d
104 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
29. Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. g,INST'NS CODE ANN. §5276 (West 1967); FLA. STAT. §394.459(2)
(1971); IDAHO CODE ANN. §66-344 (Supp. 1969); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 91Y, §§12-2, -16, 100-7
(Supp. 1965); IOWA CODE §226.15 (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. §202.840 (1972); N.M. STAT.
§34-2-13 (1954); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW ch. 27, §86 (McKinney 1972); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 43A, §§2, 91 (1954); TEx. RE%. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-70 (1958); UTAH CODE ANN.
§64-7-46 (1953).
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culmination of prior rulings on the rights of mental patients in Alabama.
In the first of these suits petitioner brought a class action on behalf of himself, other patients, and certain staff members of the Bryce Hospital in Birmingham, Alabama, 32 requesting a court order fixing standards to be followed
by Alabama mental health institutions. The suit followed a cut in the state
mental health budget that forced the dismissal of ninety-nine of Bryce Hospital's 1600 employees. 33 Pointing out that Alabama ranks fiftieth among the
states in per patient expenditures, Judge Frank Johnson declared the extant
treatment programs both scientifically and medically inadequate. 34 He further
found that patients committed to a institution for treatment purposes have
a constitutional right to treatment designed to afford a realistic opportunity
for improvement.35 The decision thus became the first to base the right to
treatment on constitutional rather than on statutory grounds. 3 The court's
order called for the submission of reports on newly implemented treatment
programs in order to evaluate their effectiveness. 37 The principal case was
foreshadowed in dicta that cautioned that the failure to supply adequate
treatment could not be justified by lack of staff or facilities. 3
Less than a year later a second suit was brought requesting the court to
appoint a master and a supervisory board for the Bryce Hospital. 9 Judge
Johnson at that time found the new program inadequate, but declined to
appoint supervisory personnel.40 He set a hearing date for six months to
design standards for the programs at Alabama mental institutions. I It was
this hearing that led to the ruling in the instant case.
In the instant case 42 the federal district court found three chief areas of
deficiency: (1) a humane psychological and physical environment, (2) qualified staff in numbers sufficient to provide adequate treatment, and (3) individualized treatment plans.43 Accordingly, the court heard testimony from
national mental health authorities and received proposed treatment standards
from the parties and amici.- 4 Both parties stipulated to a variety of conditions
they felt essential for a constitutionally acceptable minimum of treatment.4 5
Based on all evidence and proposals submitted, the court held that the
standards it set out in lengthy appendix were medical and constitutional
minimums. 46 Although ordering implementation of these standards, the court
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
Id. at 783.
Id. at 784.
Id.
See Nasen v. Superintendent, 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968).

37.
38.
39.
40.

325 F. Supp. at 785.
Id. at 784.
Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
Id. at 1344.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
Id. at 375.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 376.
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reserved ruling on appointment of a supervisory board, placing the defendants on notice that such an order would be forthcoming upon failure to
produce satisfactory compliance.47 The court reiterated the warning from
the earlier case that lack of operating funds would not justify a failure to
comply.48 However, relying on defendant's expressed intent to comply, the
court held in abeyance certain motions made by petitioner to deal with the
financial problem of the state in implementing this decree. 49 The court also
refused plaintiff's motion to temporarily enjoin further commitments to Bryce
Hospital, finding that alternatives to commitment only offered further punishment and deprivation to Alabama's mentally ill.50
The instant case culminates concerted efforts to improve the conditions
prevalent in public mental institutions. Throughout the series of cases leading
to the instant decision, the United States Government, the American Civil
Liberties Union, and the Center for Law and Policy considered the issues
important enough to participate as amici. The stringent standards imposed
by the instant case represent a revolutionary judicial assumption of traditional legislative and administrative power. These standards included:
patient-staff ratio, types of qualifications necessary for staff members, scheduling matters such as the number of hours to be spent out-of-doors, and other
matters integral to the day-to-day operation of the mental institution. Not
only has the court stepped into the legislative arena of budgeting and finance,
but its order also replaces the administrative function of standardmaking and
implementation.
The instant decision typifies the objective approach to the right to treatment, characterized by judicial consideration of the mental institution as a
whole, that is, its facilities, its staff, and its general treatment programs. This
objective approach has been advocated by some as providing the quickest
solution to treatment problems with minimal harmful effects on the individual.51 The court in the instant case delineated objective standards for the
daily operation of Alabama institutions, assuming that such standards will
insure at least a minimum of treatment for each inmate. However, some
courts, as in the Rouse decision, have utilized a more traditional subjective
approach by determining whether the individual is receiving adequate treatment and by prescribing a remedy on the individual level. Some argue that
this approach is a far surer way of guaranteeing the rights of the individual;
given the variance among programs practiced within institutions, that argument would appear to be correct.5 2 The latter approach is the only way a
court can determine if a given individual is receiving the treatment he needs.
The objective approach merely guarantees a certain environment for the
mental patient; it does not assure the patient appropriate treatment.
47. Id. at 377.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 378.
51. Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right, 57 GEo. L.J. 752, 753 (1969).
52. Halpern, A PracticingLawyer Views the Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 782, 79194 (1969).
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